上海市城镇生育保险办法

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上海市城镇生育保险办法

上海市人民政府


上海市城镇生育保险办法


(2001年10月10日上海市人民政府令第109号发布)

第一条 (目的和依据)
为了保障妇女生育期间的基本生活和医疗需求,促进妇女就业,根据《中华人民共和国劳动法》和本市实际,制定本办法。
第二条 (适用范围)
本办法适用于具有本市城镇户籍并参加本市城镇社会保险的从业或者失业生育妇女。
第三条 (管理部门)
上海市劳动和社会保障局(以下简称市劳动保障局)是本市城镇生育保险的行政主管部门,负责本市城镇生育保险的统一管理。市和区、县生育保险经办机构(以下简称经办机构)负责城镇生育保险的具体管理工作。
市卫生、医疗保险、人口和计划生育、财政等部门按照各自职责,协同做好城镇生育保险管理工作。
本市社会保险经办机构负责城镇生育保险费的征缴工作。
第四条 (缴费主体)
本市行政区域内的城镇企业、事业单位、国家机关、社会团体、民办非企业单位、个体工商户(以下统称用人单位)依本办法规定,缴纳城镇生育保险费。
第五条 (登记手续)
用人单位应当向市劳动保障局指定的社会保险经办机构办理城镇生育保险登记手续。其中,新设立的用人单位应当自设立之日起30日内,办理有关登记手续。
用人单位依法终止或者城镇生育保险登记事项发生变更,应当自有关情形发生之日起30日内,向原办理登记机构办理注销或者变更登记手续。
第六条 (缴费基数的计算方式及缴费比例)
用人单位缴纳城镇养老保险费缴费基数,为本单位缴纳城镇生育保险费基数。
用人单位每月按缴费基数0.8%的比例缴纳城镇生育保险费。个人不缴纳城镇生育保险费。
城镇生育保险费缴费比例的调整,由市劳动保障局会同市财政局共同提出,报市政府批准后执行。
第七条 (城镇生育保险费的列支渠道)
用人单位缴纳的城镇生育保险费,按照财政部门规定的渠道列支。
第八条 (征缴管理)
用人单位缴纳城镇生育保险费的程序以及征缴争议的处理,按照国家和本市社会保险费征缴管理的有关规定执行。
第九条 (基金来源)
城镇生育保险基金的来源:
(一)用人单位缴纳的城镇生育保险费;
(二)城镇生育保险基金的利息收入;
(三)城镇生育保险基金的增值运营收入;
(四)按照规定收取的滞纳金; (五)其他依法应当纳入城镇生育保险基金的资金。
城镇生育保险基金不敷使用时,由地方财政补贴。
第十条 (支付范围)
城镇生育保险基金用于下列项目的支出:
(一)生育生活津贴;
(二)生育医疗费补贴。
第十一条 (基金管理)
城镇生育保险基金实行全市统筹。城镇生育保险基金实行收支两条线管理。城镇生育保险基金应当专款专用,任何单位和个人不得擅自动用。
城镇生育保险基金的管理和监督,依照国家和本市社会保险基金的有关规定执行。
第十二条 (预决算)
城镇生育保险基金的年度预算和决算,由市经办机构负责编制,市劳动保障局审核,市财政局复核,报市政府批准。
第十三条 (津贴、补贴申领条件)
申领生育生活津贴、生育医疗费补贴的妇女必须同时具备下列条件:
(一)具有本市城镇户籍;
(二)参加本市城镇社会保险;
(三)属于计划内生育;
(四)在按规定设置产科、妇科的医疗机构生产或者流产(包括自然流产和人工流产)。
第十四条 (享受生育生活津贴的期限)
符合本办法第十三条规定的生育妇女,按照下列期限享受生育生活津贴:
(一)妊娠7个月(含7个月)以上生产的,按3个月享生育生活津贴;
(二)妊娠不满7个月早产的,按3个月享受生育生活津贴;
(三)妊娠3个月(含3个月)以上、7个月以下流产的,按1个半月享受生育生活津贴;
(四)妊娠3个月以下流产或者患子宫外孕的,按1个月享受生育生活津贴。
按照前款第(一)项、第(二)项规定享受生育生活津贴的生育妇女,还可以按照下列规定享受生育生活津贴:
(一)难产的,增加半个月的生育生活津贴;
(二)符合计划生育晚育条件的,增加半个月的生育生活津贴;
(三)多胞胎生育的,每多生育一个婴儿,增加半个月的生育生活津贴。
第十五条 (月生育生活津贴标准)
从业妇女的月生育生活津贴标准为本人生产或者流产当月城镇养老保险费缴费基数;个人缴纳城镇养老保险费不满一年的,月生育生活津贴标准按本市企业职工最低月工资标准发给。
失业妇女的月生育生活津贴标准为本人或者本市同类人员当月享受的失业保险金或者失业补助金标准。
生产或者流产的从业妇女已经享受的生育生活津贴不足其应享受的工资性收入的,不足部分的发放,按照国家和本市有关规定执行。
第十六条 (生育医疗费补贴标准)
符合本办法第十三条规定的妇女,可以享受生育医疗费补贴。支付标准为: (一)妊娠7个月(含7个月)以上生产或者妊娠不满7个月早产的,生育医疗费补贴为2500元;
(二)妊娠3个月(含3个月)以上、7个月以下自然流产的,生育医疗费补贴为400元;
(三)妊娠3个月以下自然流产的,生育医疗费补贴为200元。
第十七条 (申领津贴、补贴的手续)
符合本办法第十三条规定的妇女生育后,可以到指定的经办机构申请领取生育生活津贴、生育医疗费补贴。申请时需提供下列材料:
(一)人口和计划生育管理部门出具的属于计划内生育的证明;
(二)本人的身份证;
(三)医疗机构出具的生育医学证明。
申领人是失业妇女的除提供前款规定的材料外,还需提供经失业保险机构审核的《劳动手册》。
受委托代为申领的被委托人,还需提供申领人出具的委托书和被委托人的身份证。
任何人不得提供虚假的材料冒领或者多领生育生活津贴、生育医疗费补贴。
第十八条 (审核与计发)
经办机构应当自受理申请之日起20日内,对生育妇女享受生育生活津贴、生育医疗费补贴的条件进行审核。对符合条件的,核定其享受期限和标准,并予以一次性计发;对不符合条件的,应当书面告知。
第十九条 (失业妇女的特别规定)
失业妇女领取生育生活津贴以后,不再享受《上海市失保险办法》规定的生育补助金。
失业妇女生育所发生的检查费、药费、住院医疗费总额超过生育医疗费补贴标准以上的部分,仍可按《上海市失业保险办法》的规定申领医疗补助金。
第二十条 (经办机构经费)
经办机构开展城镇生育保险所需经费,由财政部门按规定核定。
第二十一条 (医疗机构的义务)
经办机构审核个人提供的材料时,需要医疗机构出具有关记录和病情证明的,医疗机构应当予以配合。
医疗机构及其工作人员不得出具虚假证明或者伪造病史。
第二十二条 (个人违法责任)
违反本办法第十七条第四款规定,提供虚假材料冒领、多领生育生活津贴、生育医疗费补贴的,由市劳动保障局责令其限期退回,并处以警告、100元以上1000元以下的罚款。
第二十三条 (经办机构的法律责任)
经办机构工作人员滥用职权、徇私舞弊、玩忽职守,致使城镇生育保险基金流失的,经办机构应当追回流失的城镇生育保险基金,并给予有关责任人员行政处分;情节严重构成犯罪的,依法追究刑事责任。
第二十四条 (参照执行)
下列从业的生育妇女,参照本办法执行:
(一)具有本市户籍,参加本市农村社会保险,但按本市城镇社会保险规定的缴费比例缴纳养老保险费、医疗保险费的生育妇女;
(二)在本市城镇就业并参加本市城镇社会保险的非本城镇户籍生育妇女。
单位有参加本市农村社会保险,但按本市城镇社会保险规定的缴费比例缴纳养老保险费、医疗保险费的职工的,参照本办法的规定缴纳城镇生育保险费。
第二十五条 (实施日期)
本办法自2001年11月1日起施行。市政府以前发布的有关规定与本办法不一致的,以本办法为准。

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物资部、国家计委、国家工商行政管理局对《关于禁止用铜产品的规定》中部分条文修改意见的复函

物资部 国家计委 等


物资部、国家计委、国家工商行政管理局对《关于禁止用铜产品的规定》中部分条文修改意见的复函

1990年4月26日,物资部、国家计委、国家工商行政管理局

商业部、对外经济贸易部:
商业部部发(90)日字第84号、对外经济贸易部(90)外经贸成字第287号文件收悉。关于要求对《关于禁止用铜产品的规定》(以下简称《规定》)部分条文进行修改的问题,经研究答复如下:
1、同意商业部提出的对《规定》第四条的修改意见,将该条中限定的现有库存商品,自《规定》颁布之日起,“半年内售完”,改为“一九九0年底售完”。请通知有关销售单位抓紧销售。
2、关于仓库使用的50毫米以上大规格锁头,由于铝制钥匙强度不够,开启时容易扭弯,同意使用铜钥匙。
3、出口产品的副次品和“外转内”的用铜产品,凭商检部门的证明,允许由商业部门指定的国营商店销售。不符合规定或弄虚作假者由当地工商行政管理机关没收其产品和销售所得。
4、承担援外任务的生产企业,生产援外用产品,准予使用铜料。
此复


Chapter VIII
Strengthening of the Multilateral System


Art. 23 of the DSU deals, as indicated by its title, with the “Strengthening of the Multilateral System”. Its overall design is to prevent WTO Members from unilaterally resolving their disputes in respect of WTO rights and obligations. It does so by obligating Members to follow the multilateral rules and procedures of the DSU. Art. 23 of the DSU reads:

“Strengthening of the Multilateral System
1. When Members seek the redress of a violation of obligations or other nullification or impairment of benefits under the covered agreements or an impediment to the attainment of any objective of the covered agreements, they shall have recourse to, and abide by, the rules and procedures of this Understanding.
2. In such cases, Members shall:
(a) not make a determination to the effect that a violation has occurred, that benefits have been nullified or impaired or that the attainment of any objective of the covered agreements has been impeded, except through recourse to dispute settlement in accordance with the rules and procedures of this Understanding, and shall make any such determination consistent with the findings contained in the panel or Appellate Body report adopted by the DSB or an arbitration award rendered under this Understanding;
(b) follow the procedures set forth in Article 21 to determine the reasonable period of time for the Member concerned to implement the recommendations and rulings; and
(c) follow the procedures set forth in Article 22 to determine the level of suspension of concessions or other obligations and obtain DSB authorization in accordance with those procedures before suspending concessions or other obligations under the covered agreements in response to the failure of the Member concerned to implement the recommendations and rulings within that reasonable period of time.”

In this section, to end this book, the author means to take a precise overlook on the nature of obligations under Art. 23 of the DSU as a whole by referring to two panels’ reports in part. In this respect, the Panel in US-Sections 301-310 (DS152) rules: 1
“On this basis [provision of Article 23], we conclude as follows:
(a)It is for the WTO through the DSU process - not for an individual WTO Member - to determine that a WTO inconsistency has occurred (Article 23.2(a)).
(b)It is for the WTO or both of the disputing parties, through the procedures set forth in Article 21 - not for an individual WTO Member - to determine the reasonable period of time for the Member concerned to implement DSB recommendations and rulings (Article 23.2(b)).
(c)It is for the WTO through the procedures set forth in Article 22 - not for an individual WTO Member - to determine, in the event of disagreement, the level of suspension of concessions or other obligations that can be imposed as a result of a WTO inconsistency, as well as to grant authorization for the actual implementation of these suspensions.
Article 23.2 clearly, thus, prohibits specific instances of unilateral conduct by WTO Members when they seek redress for WTO inconsistencies in any given dispute. This is, in our view, the first type of obligations covered under Article 23.
Article 23.1 is not concerned only with specific instances of violation. It prescribes a general duty of a dual nature. First, it imposes on all Members to ‘have recourse to’ the multilateral process set out in the DSU when they seek the redress of a WTO inconsistency. In these circumstances, Members have to have recourse to the DSU dispute settlement system to the exclusion of any other system, in particular a system of unilateral enforcement of WTO rights and obligations. This, what one could call ‘exclusive dispute resolution clause’, is an important new element of Members' rights and obligations under the DSU. Second, Article 23.1 also prescribes that Members, when they have recourse to the dispute settlement system in the DSU, have to ‘abide by’ the rules and procedures set out in the DSU. This second obligation under Article 23.1 is of a confirmatory nature: when having recourse to the DSU Members must abide by all DSU rules and procedures.
Turning to the second paragraph under Article 23, Article 23.2 - which, on its face, addresses conduct in specific disputes - starts with the words ‘[i]n such cases’. It is, thus, explicitly linked to, and has to be read together with and subject to, Article 23.1.
Indeed, two of the three prohibitions mentioned in Article 23.2 - Article 23.2(b) and (c) - are but egregious examples of conduct that contradicts the rules and procedures of the DSU which, under the obligation in Article 23.1 to ‘abide by the rules and procedures’ of the DSU, Members are obligated to follow. These rules and procedures clearly cover much more than the ones specifically mentioned in Article 23.2. There is a great deal more State conduct which can violate the general obligation in Article 23.1 to have recourse to, and abide by, the rules and procedures of the DSU than the instances especially singled out in Article 23.2.
Article 23 interdicts, thus, more than action in specific disputes, it also provides discipline for the general process WTO Members must follow when seeking redress of WTO inconsistencies. A violation of the explicit provisions of Article 23 can, therefore, be of two different kinds. It can be caused
(a)by an ad hoc, specific action in a given dispute, or
(b)by measures of general applicability, e.g. legislation or regulations, providing for a certain process to be followed which does not, say, include recourse to the DSU dispute settlement system or abide by the rules and procedures of the DSU.”
Furthermore, as to Art. 23 of the DSU, the Panel in US-Import Measures (DS165) confirms the ruling developed in US-Sections 301-310, and states: 2
“The Panel believes that the adopted Panel Report on United States - Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974 (‘US - Section 301’) has confirmed the crucial importance that WTO Members place on the dispute settlement system of the WTO, as the exclusive means to redress any violations of any provisions of the WTO Agreement. This fundamental principle is embedded in Article 23 of the DSU: …
An important reason why Article 23 of the DSU must be interpreted with a view to prohibiting any form of unilateral action is because such unilateral actions threaten the stability and predictability of the multilateral trade system, a necessary component for "market conditions conducive to individual economic activity in national and global markets" which, in themselves, constitute a fundamental goal of the WTO. Unilateral actions are, therefore, contrary to the essence of the multilateral trade system of the WTO. As stated in the Panel Report on US - Section 301:
‘7.75 Providing security and predictability to the multilateral trading system is another central object and purpose of the system which could be instrumental to achieving the broad objectives of the Preamble. Of all WTO disciplines, the DSU is one of the most important instruments to protect the security and predictability of the multilateral trading system and through it that of the market-place and its different operators. DSU provisions must, thus, be interpreted in the light of this object and purpose and in a manner which would most effectively enhance it.’
The structure of Article 23 is that the first paragraph states the general prohibition or general obligation, i.e. when Members seek the redress of a WTO violation, they shall do so only through the DSU. This is a general obligation. Any attempt to seek ‘redress’ can take place only in the institutional framework of the WTO and pursuant to the rules and procedures of the DSU.
The prohibition against unilateral redress in the WTO sectors is more directly provided for in the second paragraph of Article 23. From the ordinary meaning of the terms used in the chapeau of Article 23.2 (‘in such cases, Members shall’), it is also clear that the second paragraph of Article 23 is ‘explicitly linked to, and has to be read together with and subject to, Article 23.1’. That is to say, the specific prohibitions of paragraph 2 of Article 23 have to be understood in the context of the first paragraph, i.e. when such action is performed by a WTO Member with a view to redressing a WTO violation.
We also agree with the US - Section 301 Panel Report that Article 23.2 contains ‘egregious examples of conduct that contradict the rules of the DSU’ and which constitute more specific forms of unilateral actions, otherwise generally prohibited by Article 23.1 of the DSU.
‘[t]hese rules and procedures [Article 23.1] clearly cover much more than the ones specifically mentioned in Article 23.2. There is a great deal more State conduct which can violate the general obligation in Article 23.1 to have recourse to, and abide by, the rules and procedures of the DSU than the instances especially singled out in Article 23.2.’
The same Panel identified a few examples of such instances where the DSU could be violated contrary to the provisions of Article 23. Each time a Member seeking the redress of a WTO violation is not abiding by a rule of the DSU, it thus violates Article 23.1 of the DSU.
In order to verify whether individual provisions of Article 23.2 have been infringed (keeping in mind that the obligation to also observe other DSU provisions can be brought under the umbrella of Article 23.1), we must first determine whether the measure at issue comes under the coverage of Article 23.1. In other words, we need to determine whether Article 23 is applicable to the dispute before addressing the specific violations envisaged in the second paragraph of Article 23 of the DSU or elsewhere in the DSU.
Article 23.1 of the DSU provides that the criterion for determining whether Article 23 is applicable is whether the Member that imposed the measure was ‘seeking the redress of’ a WTO violation. …
The term ‘seeking’ or ‘to seek’ is defined in the Webster New Encyclopedic Dictionary as: ‘to resort to, … to make an attempt, try’. This term would therefore cover situations where an effort is made to redress WTO violations (whether perceived or WTO determined violations). The term ‘to redress’ is defined in the New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary as ‘repair (an action); atone for (a misdeed); remedy or remove; to set right or rectify (injury, a wrong, a grievance etc.); obtaining reparation or compensation’. The term ‘redress’ is defined in the New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary as: ‘reparation of or compensation for a wrong or consequent loss; remedy for or relief from some trouble; correction or reformation of something wrong’. The term 'redress' implies, therefore, a reaction by a Member against another Member, because of a perceived (or WTO determined) WTO violation, with a view to remedying the situation.
Article 23.1 of the DSU prescribes that when a WTO Member wants to take any remedial action in response to what it views as a WTO violation, it is obligated to have recourse to and abide by the DSU rules and procedures. In case of a grievance on a WTO matter, the WTO dispute settlement mechanism is the only means available to WTO Members to obtain relief, and only the remedial actions envisaged in the WTO system can be used by WTO Members. The remedial actions relate to restoring the balance of rights and obligations which form the basis of the WTO Agreement, and include the removal of the inconsistent measure, the possibility of (temporary) compensation and, in last resort, the (temporary) suspension of concessions or other obligations authorised by the DSB (Articles 3.7 and 22.1 of the DSU). The latter remedy is essentially retaliatory in nature.”



【NOTE】:
1. See, in detail, WT/DS152/R/7.38-7.46.
2. See, in detail, WT/DS165/R/6.13-6.23.



List of References

1 Sources of Legal Texts: http://www.wto.org; WTO Secretariat: The WTO Dispute Settlement Procedures (Second Edition), CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS, 2001.